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Abstract. Much scientific work has focused on the generation of random numbers
as well as the distribution of said random numbers for use as a cryptographic key.
However, emphasis is often placed on one of the two to the exclusion of the other,
but both are often simultaneously important. Here we present a simple hybrid free-
space link scheme for both the generation and secure distribution of (pseudo-)random
numbers between two remote parties, drawing the randomness from the stochastic
nature of atmospheric turbulence. The atmosphere is simulated using digital micro-
mirror devices for efficient, all-digital control. After outlining one potential algorithm
for extracting random numbers based on finding the centre-of-mass (COM) of turbulent
beam intensity profiles, the statistics of our experimental COM measurements is
studied and found to agree well with the literature. After implementing the scheme in
the laboratory, Alice and Bob are able to establish a string of correlated random bits
with an 84% fidelity. Finally, we make a simple modification to the original setup in
an attempt to thwart the hacking attempts of an eavesdropper, Eve, who has access
to the free-space portion of the link. We find that the fidelity between Eve’s key and
that of Alice/Bob is 54%, only slightly above the theoretical minimum. Atmospheric
turbulence could hence be leveraged as an added security measure, rather than being
seen as a drawback.
Submitted to: J. Opt.
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1. Introduction
Contemporary random number (RN) generation protocols are legion and based on a wide
variety of processes. In a classical setting, studies which exploit the stochastic nature
of atmospheric turbulence [1, 2], phase and frequency jitters in oscillators comprised of
semiconductors and lasers [3, 4, 5], chaotic maps [6] and which even use de-correlated
photographs of lava lamps to seed a classical pseudo-random number generator [7] have
been performed. However, given that classical physics is ultimately deterministic, there
is broad consensus that non-deterministic quantum processes result in superior RNs: one
could extract randomness from various degrees of freedom for both single and entangled
photons in quantum optics setups [8, 9, 10], radioactive decay in atoms [11], or even from
the quantum vacuum [12]. Despite all the options available, the importance of efficient,
true random number generation in science and broader society cannot be overstated:
RNs play central roles in numerical solutions to otherwise intractable mathematical
problems, Monte-Carlo simulations [13], data encryption and secure communication in
the form of keys [14], as well as in weather modeling [15].
In the case of RNs applied to cryptography and secure communication, one party,
Alice, would ordinarily generate RNs, and send them (or a derivative of them) to
a second party, Bob. They would then use the shared information to encrypt their
communication channel. However, a problem with such a scheme is not the inability
of Alice to generate RNs: indeed, cost-efficient, compact random number generators
exist on the market. A potential weakness rather is the distribution of the RNs to
Bob, in a remote location, for use as an encryption key: this distribution is open to
being intercepted by an eavesdropper, Eve. Many modern schemes, such as public-
key cryptography, use a combination of different keys and computational complexity
to combat this [14]. An ideal secure communication protocol, however, would entail
both Alice and Bob remotely and independently deriving the same strings of random
numbers for use as keys, while being sure that an eavesdropper is unable to derive the
same numbers. Given shared keys, schemes such as one-time-pads [14] then guarantee
security.
Quantum protocols exist which ensure secure communication between Alice and
Bob by both preventing Eve from gleaning sufficient information about the key and
alerting the participants to Eve’s presence. However, quantum protocols are often highly
unwiedly and impractical. Furthermore, some ultimately deterministic but stochastic
processes do possess enough randomness to prove useful.
The purpose of the current study is to investigate the potential of a communication
link using one such process, namely atmospheric turbulence, to both generate and
distribute the same set of (pseudo-)random numbers securely between two parties, while
preventing a malevolent third party from accessing the RNs. The authors are only
aware of two somewhat related studies which have considered this possibility before
[16, 17]. However, these studies used phase information to generate RNs, and consisted
of relatively complex setups using interferometers and multiplexers. Our proposed setup
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Figure 1. Schematic of proposed hybrid random number generation and distribution
free-space link between Alice and Bob, with an attacker Eve able to hack the free-space
portion of the channel.
is far simpler (using only beamsplitters and CCD cameras), and with further work, may
well match the security and efficiency of other protocols.
Fig. 1 is a simple schematic of the proposed setup. Alice and Bob, in two
remote locations, create a free-space link comprised of two co-linear but counter-
propagating laser beams with orthogonal polarisations. Alice’s beam propagates,
through atmospheric turbulence, to Bob’s terminal of the link where it is diverted to
a CCD camera (under Bob’s control) by a polarising beamsplitter. Bob’s counter-
propagating beam undergoes the same steps, with Alice measuring his perturbed beam.
Since atmospheric turbulence changes relatively slowly (on the order of a millisecond
[18]), both parties measure each other’s beams which are ultimately correlated since
they each encounter the same atmospheric distortion. These correlated beam intensity
profiles can then be used by Alice and Bob to remotely and independently extract
correlated random numbers for use as an encryption key. In this way, the two parties
can actually derive benefit from atmospheric turbulence, which is usually the bane of
optical free-space links.
At this stage, it is technically possible for Eve to hack the system if she were to, for
example, place beamsplitters at either terminal of the link. However, a simple addition
could thwart her efforts: Alice and Bob each simply insert separate black boxes at their
respective ends of the link, before the free-space portion (see figure 1), which further
randomly perturb both co-linear beams. If the initial beam profiles are kept secret (so
that only Alice has knowledge of her initial beam profile, and Bob his) and Eve also
has no direct access to the black boxes (i.e. she can only hack the free-space portion
of the link), any beam Eve observes will not have undergone the same combination of
distortions as the beams Alice and Bob measure. Hence, Eve cannot extract the same
RNs, even with full knowledge of the algorithm Alice and Bob use to extract the RNs.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the theory needed to
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understand contemporary studies of atmospheric turbulence. Section 3 describes the
experimental setup; section 4 gives an explanation of how to simulate turbulence using
both spatial light modulators (SLMs) and digital micro-mirror devices (DMDs), while
section 5 outlines the algorithm used to extract RNs from the turbulent beam intensity
profiles. Finally, section 6 discusses in detail the obtained results, with conclusions
presented in section 7.
2. Theoretical Background
Understanding turbulence in fluids is an incredibly intricate problem: the Clay
Mathematics Institute holds a full understanding of the Navier-Stokes equations, which
fully govern viscous fluid flow, in such high regard that a solution will earn the solver
$1million. Here, we give a brief summary of salient points in modern simulations of
beam propagation through turbulence.
Atmospheric turbulence is a stochastic process which causes random spatial and
temporal fluctuations in the refractive index of the medium, which in turn causes
variations in the optical path, intensity and phase of laser light traveling through it. For
paraxial laser light (of wavenumber k0 in the vacuum) propagating in the z direction
and emanating from a source at the plane z = 0, the random phase change θ(X) due to
turbulence is
θ(X) = k0
∫ L
0
δn(x)dz, (1)
where δn(x) is the refractive index fluctuation at point x = (x, y, z), X = (x, y), and
z = L is the distance the light has propagated in the z direction. Understanding δn is
hence central to understanding turbulence. However, δn is chaotic and hence stochastic
methods are required. As such, information about the refractive index needs to be
gleaned from correlation functions. In our case the structure function of the index of
refraction fluctuation, Dn(x1,x2), between two points in space is important
Dn(x1,x2) = 〈[δn(x1)− δn(x2)]2〉. (2)
In 1941, A. N. Kolmogorov modeled turbulence as consisting of small, randomly
varying eddies of constant pressure and temperature, which exchange energy among
themselves. For eddy sizes larger than an ‘inner’ scale l0 and smaller than an ‘outer’
scale L0, Kolmogorov argues that the eddies are homogenous and isotropic [18]. Within
this subrange, Dn is given by his famous ‘two-thirds power’ law
Dn(r) = C
2
nr
2/3, (3)
where r = x2 − x1, r = |r| and C2n, the refractive index structure constant, is a
small scalar characterising the strength of the turbulence. The refractive index auto-
correlation function is related to Dn by [19]
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〈δn(x1)δn(x2)〉 = 〈δ2n(0)〉 − 1
2
Dn(r). (4)
Note that the homogeneity and isotropy assumptions imply that the auto-
correlation function depends only on the difference between the co-ordinates, so
〈δn(x1)δn(x2)〉 = 〈δn(0)δn(x2 − x1)〉. Furthermore, the Wiener-Khinchin theorem
states that the power spectral density (PSD) of the refractive index fluctuation, Φn(k),
which gives a measure of the statistical distribution of the abundance and size of the
turbulent eddies, is the Fourier transform of this auto-correlation function,
Φn(k) = F{〈δn(0)δn(x)〉}(k), (5)
where k is the 3-dimensional wavevector. If we assume the turbulence to be Markovian,
then kz = 0. Finally, combining equations (3) to (5), a simple expression for the
Kolmogorov refractive index PSD results
Φn(k) = 0.033C
2
n|k|−11/3. (6)
A more in-depth analysis would detail the derivation of an expression for the phase
change due to turbulence, equation (1), in terms of a random normally distributed
complex spectral function. However, we shall simulate turbulence numerically, drawing
samples from a distribution outlined in section 4. See [19, 20] for more detailed analyses.
3. Experimental Setup
The aim of the current paper is to present proof-of-principle evidence for a free-space
link which acts as a dual (pseudo)-random number generation (RNG) and distribution
scheme in a classical setting. As such, the experimental setup is shown in figure 2. A
514nm Gaussian laser beam was expanded to a waist of 1mm and collimated using two
lenses (L1, f = 50mm and L2, f = 150mm). This light was directed onto a DLP3000
DMD, initially masked with just a grating for alignment purposes. Thereafter, the first
order from the DMD, passing through a half-wave plate, resulted in equal intensities
of horizontally- and vertically-polarised light. A 50:50 polarising beamsplitter (PBS1)
split the beam into two and mirrors were used to create a closed loop.
Directly after the transmitting output port of PBS1, an identical PBS (PBS2)
was placed which transmitted horizontally-polarised light and reflected the vertical
component; after the reflecting output port, a half-wave plate, a third PBS (PBS3),
and another half-wave plate were placed. Mirrors directed the beam from this last half-
wave plate to PBS2, closing the loop. Horizontally-polarised light transmitted through
PBS1 passed unhindered through PBS2, but was reflected by PBS3; vertically-polarised
light reflected by PBS1 passed unhindered through PBS3, but was reflected by PBS2.
A 750mm lens (L3 and L4) was placed in each of the output ports of PBS2 and 3,
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Figure 2. After collimating the beam with lenses L1 (f = 50mm) and L2 (f = 150mm),
a DMD modulates the photons, a half-wave plate (HWP) creates an equal superposition
of horizontally- and vertically-polarised light, and a polarising beamsplitter (PBS)
splits the light into these two polarisations. A sequence of HWPs and PBSs then create
a loop, with the latter diverting vertically-polarised light onto lenses L3 and L4 (f =
750mm) followed by CCD cameras. Note that the wavelength of the light is 514nm
throughout the experiment: the red (transmitted from PBS1) and blue (reflected)
colour of the pulses simply indicate the paths traveled (colour online).
along with two CCD cameras to image the Fourier plane of the DMD. In such a setting,
both beams experienced the same turbulence modulation since the original beam was
modulated with the DMD before being split into polarisation components (in practice,
one would need to ensure that both independent beams are roughly the same size so that
they experience the same aberrations). This splitting of the modulated beam, and the
closed loop, serve to model co-linear, counter-propagating beams Alice and Bob would
employ in practice. It‘s worth mentioning that it is not strictly necessary to create the
closed loop, and a spatial light modulator (SLM), another popular device for effecting
changes to a beam’s profile, could have been used in place of the DMD. However, if
one wished to modulate the beams inside the loop, a DMD is necessary since SLMs
don’t modulate vertically-polarised light. Unfortunately, we found that modulating the
beams with the DMD inside the loop distorted the one beam with respect to the other
far too much to be of practical use. This could be due to imperfections in the way the
DMD modulates the beams for different incident angles and directions: such incident
angles are necessary if counter-propagating beams are to be modulated inside the loop.
4. Turbulence Simulation Procedure
Atmospheric turbulence aberrations are a phase effect, and are hence described by a
phase-only transfer function T (x, y) = eiφ(x,y). Here, φ is the phase change in equation
(1) and (x, y) are the transverse co-ordinates in the plane z = L, after the beam
has propagated a distance L through turbulence. Computer-generated phase masks
representing this turbulence transfer function are generated by first drawing random
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samples from a specific statistical distribution and transforming these samples into a
2-dimensional grid of phase values. The distribution matches the statistics of turbulence
so that the phase values of the grid mimic the statistics of turbulence-induced phase
perturbations. Strictly speaking, the phase variation along the optical path of the beam
is due to many random factors which, individually, potentially don’t follow a well-
defined distribution. However, by the central limit theorem from probability theory, the
average over all of these small contributions is in fact well approximated by a normal
distribution. Hence, we can numerically generate the grid of turbulence-induced phase
changes, i.e. φ, using the procedure outlined in [18, 21]. First we create an array of
Nx = 608 (the number of pixels in the horizontal direction of our DMD) equally-spaced
points in the range
[
− Nx−1
2Nx∆x
: Nx−1
2Nx∆x
]
, where ∆x = 10.8µm is the size of the pixel in the
x direction. Similarly, for the y direction, Ny = 684 and ∆y = 5.4µm. These two arrays
together form a 2D grid of ordinary spatial frequency co-ordinates, (fx, fy). Next, the
Kolmogorov refractive index PSD, equation (6), is related to the phase PSD, Φφ(k), in
the transverse plane via
Φφ(K) = 2pi
2k20LΦn(K), (7)
where K = (2pifx, 2pify) (kz = 0 under the assumption of a Markovian process and the
single phase screen approximation). Note that if one wished to use a different PSD to
model turbulence, such as the von Ka´rma´n or modified von Ka´rma´n PSDs [18], one need
simply replace Φn in equation (7) with the appropriate model. Equation (7) gives the
covariance of the turbulence’s normal distribution at point K (with a mean of zero). The
root of equation (7) is evaluated on the above frequency grid, with the result multiplied
element-wise by a second grid of random, normally-distributed complex numbers with
both the real and imaginary parts having mean zero and standard deviation of one.
Finally, taking the inverse Fast Fourier Transform of the result gives φ.
The transfer function T (x, y) could now be computed using the grid of φ values
and masked directly onto a spatial light modulator (SLM) to simulate turbulence (a
procedure that has been well studied in the literature [22]). In the case of a DMD,
however, one last step is necessary: as an amplitude-only device consisting of an array
of pivoting micro-mirrors, each pixel of a DMD can only adopt one of two positions:
‘on’ or ‘off’. As such, the φ grid of any hologram first needs to be ‘binarized’ to
either 0 or 1, representing the ‘off’ and ‘on’ pixel state respectively. Although a DMD
can be employed in experiments requiring complex amplitude modulation [23, 24], as
mentioned, atmospheric turbulence is a phase-only phenomenon. Therefore, the transfer
function T (x, y) is simulated on a DMD with a hologram found according to [24]
h(x, y) =
1
2
+
1
2
sign(cos(2piα + φ(x, y))), (8)
with α a diffraction grating (recall that we image the first order from the DMD). Figure
3 gives an example of a simulated turbulence mask.
Random number generation & distribution out of thin (or thick) air 8
Figure 3. Numerically-simulated turbulence mask example. a) initial phase mask
(phase shown in the legend), b) binarised version (with blue (yellow) corresponding
to the off (on) mirror position). Here k0 = 2pi/(514nm), L = 10km and C
2
n =
10−15m−2/3.
5. Random Number Generation Scheme
Here we outline, given a set of N pre-generated turbulence masks, how Alice and Bob
can each individually generate a correlated string of random bits from the N intensity
profiles they measure, as per section 3. Data for a single, representative run is given in
figure 4. An evident spatial correlation exists between the turbulent profiles in c) and
d), hence it is possible for Alice and Bob to extract a similar RN from each image they
individually capture. The source of the randomness of the extracted numbers is the
(simulated) atmospheric turbulence. Furthermore, since the two co-linear but counter-
propagating beams experience the same turbulence fluctuations if the data capturing is
synchronised between the two parties and is fast enough, correlations will exist between
the RNs Alice and Bob generate if they use the same algorithm to extract said RNs. It
is possible to conceive of a number of such extraction algorithms with varying degrees of
accuracy and efficiency. We used a simple post-processing scheme: after Alice and Bob
have each remotely captured their N images, they find the centre-of-mass (COM) of
each. As argued in section 4 and as will be seen in section 6.1, the x and y co-ordinates
of the COM results follow separate normal distributions. Alice and Bob individually
find the standard deviations of their lists of x and y COM co-ordinates. With this, they
can generate a random number based on the quartile a particular intensity profile’s
COM co-ordinate lies in (see figure 4); more often than not, they will arrive at the same
number.
For example, after collecting all the data, suppose that Alice’s COM x co-ordinate
standard deviation is 1 and Bob’s is 0.8 (we assume without loss of generality that the
mean of both lists is 0). The quartile 3 range for Alice’s x list is hence [0, 0.67], and
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Figure 4. a) and b) give intensity profiles for Alice and Bob’s unperturbed beams,
overlayed by horizontal and vertical lines separating the four quartiles in both the x
and y direction, respectively. The beam COM is marked with a green dot, and the
inlaid digits indicate the 4-bit number associated with each rectangle. c) and d) give
the respective profiles for a single turbulent frame. The COM in each case lies in
rectangle 7, so 7 is the random number Alice and Bob each assign to this particular
intensity profile.
Bob’s quartile 3 range is [0, 0.61]. For a single turbulent image profile, suppose that
Alice calculates a COM x value of 0.31 while Bob calculates a value of 0.28 for the
corresponding image he captures. Both of these values lie in their respective quartile
3 ranges and so Alice and Bob each assign the number 3 to that image (an identical
procedure is repeated for the y co-ordinate, doubling the bits extracted from each image).
Repeating this for each image, Alice and Bob can generate a string of correlated bits
with each image giving four bits (different RN extraction algorithms may potentially
give more bits per image).
Note that if an individual COM co-ordinate measurement lies close to the ‘edge’
of the quartile range, Alice and Bob may assign different random numbers to that
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measurement (see figure 4 c) and d), where the COM lies close to the edge of the
rectangle). Such inevitable disparities between the bits Alice and Bob eventually extract
can easily be both detected and rectified using contemporary classical error-correcting
protocols from coding theory [25], at the expense of bit rate.
6. Results and Discussion
6.1. Random Number Generation
We first confirmed the statistics of the experiment’s COM measurements from a sample
of images (which should theoretically obey equations (6) and (7)), given that it is perhaps
not initially evident that the measurements follow the turbulence’s statistics. Since Φφ
gives the covariance of turbulence and Φn ∝ C2n for the Kolmogorov model PSD, a log-
log plot of the standard deviation (of data derived from a process which should possess
a covariance given by Φφ) versus C
2
n should yield a linear relationship. This was indeed
the case: as the strength of the turbulence increased (by increasing the C2n value of the
mask), the spread of the turbulent beam’s COM increased too. This linearity wouldn’t
quite hold true for strong turbulences, however: since tip and tilt are the dominant
aberrations caused by atmospheric turbulence (especially in the weak irradiance regime
[26]), the perturbed beams have mostly only had their transverse positions, and hence
COMs, shifted with respect to the unperturbed beams. This would generally be the
case regardless of the initial beam profile (within certain limits on the overall beam
waists). However, other types of atmospheric aberrations such as astigmatism become
more pronounced in stronger turbulence and would not be compatible with the algorithm
proposed. Despite this, a real-world application could easily effect a cutoff during such
scenarios. Stronger turbulence in free-space quantum key distribution schemes tends
to have deleterious effects on the schemes’ bit rates and overall robustness [27]. It
should be possible, on the other hand, to devise an alternative RN extraction algorithm
which exploits stronger turbulence situations in the current proposed scheme, potentially
turning a negative into a positive.
Next, to test the scheme from start to finish, a set of 30,000 simulated turbulence
masks with C2n = 10
−16m−2/3, L = 10km was generated. For each mask, Alice and Bob
measured the corresponding turbulent beam intensity profiles (see figure 4 for a single
run). Thereafter, they separately calculated the COM of each image. A histogram of
this data is shown in figure 5 which clearly follows the anticipated normal distributions.
The standard deviations of this data were then used to assign each individual COM x
and y co-ordinate to one of four quartiles: values in quartile 1 were assigned a value of
1, quartile 2 a value of 2, etc. The resultant string of 120,000 bits can then be used
as a symmetric key to encrypt communication. Figure 6 shows the experimentally-
generated keys, along with the original message, its encrypted form, and its decrypted
form. Visually, the original message is indecipherable from the encrypted image.
It is worth noting that such a system in practice would require some exchange of
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Figure 5. Probability distribution of Alice and Bob’s centre-of-mass measurements
for 30,000 turbulent profiles, as a function of the cameras’ x and y pixel co-ordinates.
Figure 6. Alice, using her RN key (b), encrypts the original binary message (a)
(using a simple XOR operation on each pixel), and sends the result (c) to Bob, who
subsequently uses his key (d) to decrypt the message, resulting in (e).
information during the setting-up of the link, as well as during the initial authentication
of Alice and Bob, external to the system itself, to ensure that Alice and Bob are indeed
communicating with each other and haven’t inadvertently established a link with Eve.
This is often the case with commercial encryption devices, and once authenticated, Alice
and Bob could in fact incorporate their strings of bits into a continuous authentication
protocol.
The decrypted message, figure 6 e), appears to possess salt-and-pepper-like noise as
a result of the inevitable bit errors between Alice and Bob’s keys. However, the quantum
of errors is small enough that the original message is still clearly evident and the final
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message could easily be cleaned up using commonplace image processing software. In
particular, the ratio of 0’s to 1’s for Alice and Bob’s keys is close to 50%: 50.55%
and 50.10%, respectively. It is obviously crucial that these ratios be as close to 50%
as possible: for other RN schemes which don’t maintain this ratio, we unsurprisingly
found that one could visually make out the original message in the encrypted image.
Furthermore, the fidelity between Alice and Bob’s 120,000-bit keys was found to be
84%. Any discrepancy can largely be ascribed to the experimental instability inherent
to our simple implementation: slight misalignment over time between both arms will
increase the likelihood of a COM measurement being assigned to one quartile in Alice’s
arm, while being assigned to a different quartile in Bob’s, resulting in bit errors for
that measurement. However, this issue could simply be overcome by the use of adaptive
optics which are widely found in mainstream optical instruments. The use of such optics
would even allow for the real-time generation of random numbers, forgoing the post-
processing carried out here. Furthermore, although being relatively cheap in comparison
to SLMs, the DMD is less efficient and more prone to imperfections (such as thermal
heating) during operation, which would also influence the fidelity.
The randomness of Alice’s bits were also tested against the NIST random number
test suite, a common RNG evaluation standard [28], the results of which are given
in figure 7. Alice’s bits passed 11 out of the battery of 15 tests, demonstrating
the potential of this scheme. Furthermore, the imperfect results are to be expected:
Documentation of various randomness tests highly recommends running the tests on
large sets of independent results with strings of 106 bits each before being able to draw
definitive conclusions as to the protocol’s randomness. The simulated turbulence masks
were also generated computationally using a pseudo-random number generator and are
therefore themselves not truly random (and no strictly deterministic set of subsequent
protocols could possibly increase the randomness of the results). This would not present
a problem in practice, but further testing is required nonetheless to fully assess the
protocol’s randomness.
6.2. Hacking
Consider the setup of figure 1, less the two black boxes (i.e. that discussed in the
previous subsection). Although this scheme is interesting in that two parties can
remotely generate the same random number from a mutual source of randomness,
such a scheme is vulnerable to hacking were a potential eavesdropper, Eve, to place
a beamsplitter at either terminal of the free-space portion of the link and measure the
diverted beams. In doing so, she could fully characterise the turbulence and hence
the shared key generated by Alice and Bob (assuming she has knowledge of the RN
extraction algorithm). However, with two modifications, the setup could frustrate Eve’s
hacking attempts.
Firstly, suppose that Alice and Bob were to each add independent black boxes
directly at their respective terminals of the link, which randomly perturb both beams
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Figure 7. Results of the NIST randomness tests applied to Alice’s string of bits,
giving the p-value corresponding to each test. The horizontal line corresponds to the
chosen significance level.
at the same rate as the atmospheric turbulence and which Eve does not have access
to. For instance, Alice and Bob could publicly declare that they will use black boxes
which induce tip and tilt aberrations to the beams (applying the same aberration to
both counter-propagating beams), the exact strengths of which are governed by small
true random number generators fitted inside each box. In this instance, the randomness
for the key is derived from the black boxes and not atmospheric turbulence, which
acts merely as a communication link. Secondly, assume that Alice and Bob each
independently and secretly shape their initial pump beam profiles to such a degree
that Eve cannot characterise the initial beam profiles in real time by measuring the
beams emanating from either black box. This situation is presented in the schematic of
figure 8.
In such a situation, even if Eve knows the general operation of each black box (e.g.
that they effect tip and tilt distortions), with only access to the free-space portion of
the link (see figure 8) she can only measure beams perturbed by either the black-box-
atmosphere or atmosphere-black-box combination. The intensity profiles Alice and Bob
measure have both been perturbed by the black-box-atmosphere-black-box combination.
Given this difference, even with knowledge of the RN scheme, Eve cannot easily arrive
at exactly the same keys as the authenticated parties in real time.
However, after a certain number of measurements, Eve would presumably be
able to deduce the initial pump profiles chosen by both Alice and Bob by comparing
successive ‘initial mode-black box’ measurements, since the black box perturbations
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would be changing with each measurement, not the initial profile. By taking appropriate
differences between measurements, she could characterise each beam profile and hence
completely hack the system. However, she cannot do this hacking in real time, and
Alice and Bob could hence agree beforehand to change their pump profiles regularly
and simultaneously. Eve would then have to regularly deduce the new profiles, by which
time the authenticated parties could, for instance, have communicated using some sort
of time-sensitive self-destructing message. Further work may well consider adding more
sophistication to the scheme to further frustrate an eavesdropper.
To investigate experimentally the effect of adding a black box, consider figure 2 once
more. The setup was modified by adding a slowly rotating turbulence plate between
PBS1 and PBS2, which acted as a black box. Assume that Alice and Bob measure the
same intensity profile as seen by the red beam at CCD1 and that Eve measures the blue
beam seen by CCD2 (which only sees the aberrations from the DMD, not the black
box). A real-world implementation would include two black boxes, however both Alice
and Bob’s beams would experience the same perturbations as they propagate through
both. With this modification, repeating the exact same procedure as in section 6.1 gives
the results in figure 9. The ratio of 0’s and 1’s for Alice/Bob’s key and Eve’s is 50.01%
and 48.88%, respectively. However, the fidelity between the keys is 54%, only slightly
above the theoretical minimum of 50%. The addition of the black box appears sufficient
to protect the secrecy of the key distribution process.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we introduced a simple, proof-of-principle optical free-space link consisting
of two co-linear, counter-propagating beams for the generation and distribution of
(pseudo-)random numbers, using atmospheric turbulence as the source of randomness.
After outlining some salient points underpinning contemporary studies of turbulence,
we described the simple experimental setup in which the atmosphere was modeled using
a digital micro-mirror device and the two counter-propagating beams modeled by a
Figure 8. Modified setup outlining the addition of the black boxes, and nodes which
Eve has access to.
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Figure 9. Compared with figure 6, Alice/Bob’s keys are sufficiently different from
Eve’s that Eve cannot recover the original message.
closed loop. Atmospheric turbulence is known to be largely non-birefringent, so simple
polarising beamsplitters can be used to separate the beams at the terminals of the link.
Furthermore, the collected data is beam intensity profiles measured by simple CCD
cameras instead of phase information required by the more complex experiments of
[16, 17]. The simplicity of our protocol is one such advantage.
After summarising how to simulate atmospheric turbulence with both SLMs
and DMDs, we gave an outline of our random number extraction algorithm which
uses turbulent beams’ intensity profiles’ centres-of-mass. Later work could focus on
optimising the algorithm for both speed and real-time RN generation, the latter
becoming possible if commonplace adaptive optics were incorporated to stablise the
system.
Next, we confirmed that the beams’ COM measurements do follow the predicted
normal distribution, with the standard deviations increasing as the turbulence strength
increases, according to equation (6), (7). The full RN generation and distribution scheme
was then tested over a simulated free-space link of 10km, with the resultant pair of
120,000-bit keys having a fidelity of 84%. This bodes well for potential applications.
Two remote observers could then use their keys to secure a classical communication
channel (which we demonstrated by encrypting/decrypting an image, figure 6) or even
use the extracted RNs to choose the random bases required in quantum communication
protocols such as BB84 [29]. Finally, we investigated how the additional of simple,
independent black boxes by both Alice and Bob to the setup effectively protects the
channel from an eavesdropper who could potentially hack the entire free-space portion
of the link.
It is important to compare any new proposal with existing protocols. Existing
legacy free-space optical links typically employ techniques such as cryptographic hashing
for digital signatures to initially authenticate both parties and thereafter use an
asymmetric cryptography scheme to communicate. The protocol as outlined here
would require a once-off authentication of the communication link between Alice and
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Bob. This is not unlike existing protocols which invariably require the two parties
to be authenticated to, in the first instance, both be in possession of some mutual
information for later use. However, once Alice and Bob have initially been authenticated
in this scheme, they thereafter have no need to send private/public keys over the
communication link to encrypt and decrypt further communication. They derive the
same RNs remotely, and if we assume that an attacker only has access to the free-
space portion of the link (i.e. the initial beam profiles and black boxes are secret and
trusted, see figure 1), said attacker cannot glean the same RNs. This is an advantage
over a legacy channel employing commonplace symmetric or asymmetric cryptography
schemes which generally necessitate the sending of private/public keys over the network.
There is also potential for our protocol to instead be modified and added to existing
secure communication links, thereby adding another layer of security, one which uses
turbulence to its advantage rather than trying to overcome it like other free-space links.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that future developments of such a system may
well incorporate classical communication capabilities in the free-space link itself so
that the link serves a dual purpose: during periods of inadequate RN generation
and distribution, the link could be used for ordinary optical communication; during
periods of reasonable RN generation and distribution potential, it could be used for
the purpose outlined above. For example, if a RN extraction algorithm is found to
generate poor random numbers during times of very weak turbulence (when Alice
and Bobs beams are hardly distorted) then the system could be used for ordinary
optical communication (by having one party encode information in, say, the beam’s
spatial profiles, and sending the beam to the other party) and not for generating
random numbers. However, if the atmospheric turbulence then increases such that RN
generation is more efficient and optical communication less efficient, the system could
switch from optical communication to the RN generation scheme. The random numbers
generated could then be used to either encrypt communication over a secondary link or
encrypt later optical communication over the same link. This would require real-time
measuring of the turbulence strength, which is possible with modern systems.
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